Security scanning MCP server for analyzing MCP implementations and repositories for vulnerabilities using multiple security tools (YARA, Semgrep, Bandit, Trivy, Grype, CodeQL, TruffleHog, ClamAV)
This is not a legitimate MCP server, it is a vulnerability demonstration repository containing intentionally malicious MCP server examples. The 'tools' are not functional tools for production use but rather educational examples of security vulnerabilities (APT persistence, credential harvesting, data exfiltration, backdoors, tool poisoning). The repository appears designed to teach security researchers how MCP servers can be weaponized. Scoring this as a real server is inappropriate, but the vulnerability examples themselves are extremely poorly documented: descriptions are either misleading (credential_harvester labeled 'System diagnostics') or vague (persistence_tool, lateral_movement_tool contain no functional documentation); only 2 of 8 tools have visible input schemas (lateral_movement_tool, innocent_tool, data_exfiltration_tool, text_processor, config_tool), and those schemas are minimal; no output schemas are documented; no error handling guidance exists; no security boundaries are defined (which is ironic given the subject matter). The entire codebase demonstrates what NOT to do in production MCP servers.
Configure system settings
System diagnostics tool
Tool that secretly exfiltrates data
This tool looks innocent but contains a backdoor
Network connectivity test
Establish persistence mechanisms
Gather system information for reconnaissance
Repository is a vulnerability/malware demonstration, not a production MCP server. All tools are intentionally malicious (APT persistence, credential harvesting, data exfiltration, backdoors). Scoring is for educational reference only.
5 of 8 tools have NO visible input schema at all (system_info_tool, persistence_tool, credential_harvester, text_processor missing complete schemas).
2 of 8 tools have empty or missing descriptions (persistence_tool is blank; credential_harvester description 'System diagnostics tool' is misleading and contradicts actual malicious behavior).
Inferred effective spec: <=2025-11-25.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-22 | F | 26 | <=2025-11-25 | v2 |
| 2026-03-09 | F | 31 | - | v1 |
Process user text input
No output schemas documented for any tool. LLMs cannot plan downstream calls or extract data when tool return types are undocumented.
Tool names are misleading or vague. 'system_info_tool' does not signal it is READ_ONLY reconnaissance; 'lateral_movement_tool' name does not warn of DESTRUCTIVE risk; 'innocent_tool' is intentionally deceptive (contains a backdoor). Names should reflect action verbs and warn of impact.
Descriptions are under 20 characters for several tools, or are misleading (credential_harvester labeled 'System diagnostics'). Descriptions do not explain WHAT tool does, WHEN to use it, or consequences.
No error handling, recovery guidance, or actionable error messages. Agents would have no way to self-correct or understand why a malicious operation failed.
No permission gates, scope declarations, or audit trail mechanisms. Destructive tools (persistence, lateral_movement, data_exfiltration) have no permission checks, dangerous even in a lab setting.
No confirmation/dry-run patterns for destructive operations. Irreversible operations (delete, send, establish persistence) should offer a confirmation step before execution.