Loading ToolBench
Deterministic runtime guardrails and microservices for autonomous agents. Provides layer-based security architecture (Layer 0-5) with tool gating, cryptographic signing, ledger integration (XRPL), and payment settlement via x402 protocol.
This server exhibits significant gaps across naming, descriptions, and schema quality. Seven tools are registered with variable quality: tool names lack consistent action verbs (web-extract, json-repair, orderbook-depth, amm-arb-quote are hyphenated and unclear), descriptions range from adequate to vague, and several parameters lack descriptions or have incomplete schemas. The custom HTTP framework (not FastAPI/Starlette MCP compliance visible) and reliance on manual tool registration without observable MCP-native patterns (no tool annotations, no error classification) put this well below production baselines. Average per-tool score of 42 reflects a server that functions but requires substantial refinement for agent reliability.
Evaluates arbitrage opportunities between XRPL AMM pools and CLOB orderbooks for token pairs.
Retrieves local system environment metrics and OS telemetry.
Repairs malformed JSON by fixing trailing commas, unquoted keys, quote styles, and unbalanced brackets.
Queries XRPL DEX orderbook depth for a trading pair, simulates trade execution, and calculates slippage metrics.
Writes file content safely inside a dedicated workspace directory.
Gets or sets key-value runtime state in memory.
Extracts cleaned markdown content from web pages with optional link extraction and HTML sanitization.
Inconsistent naming conventions: web-extract, json-repair, orderbook-depth, amm-arb-quote use hyphens and lack clear action verbs (pattern: tool names should follow verb_noun like 'extract_web_page', 'repair_json', 'query_orderbook_depth'). LLMs struggle to infer intent from hyphenated names without action verbs.
Parameter 'action' in system_state_store lacks context in description. Description should explain the semantic difference: 'Retrieve (no side effects) vs set (persistent state mutation)'. Currently vague for LLM safety reasoning.
orderbook-depth and amm-arb-quote have nested object schemas (base/quote with currency/issuer) but parameters lack descriptions for nested fields. LLMs cannot infer that 'issuer' is nullable for native XRP. Schema documentation is incomplete.
Inferred effective spec: <=2025-11-25.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | D | 55 | <=2025-11-25 | v2 |
web-extract max_length parameter (default 50000) and orderbook-depth depth_limit lack minimum/maximum bounds in descriptions. Unbounded numeric parameters invite LLM hallucinations of absurd values (e.g., max_length=999999999).
No error handling guidance visible in tool definitions. None of the tools document what to do on failure (retryable vs user-fixable vs fatal). Code snippet shows execute_metering() handles HTTP 402/429 but no tool descriptions mention these error modes.
sandboxed_file_writer description does not mention constraints: what file paths are allowed? Can agents write outside workspace? What file types are blocked? No guardrails documented.
Output schemas not documented for any tool. LLMs cannot predict what fields to expect or plan downstream tool calls. Critical for tool composition.
web-extract and json-repair have metering costs embedded (COST_WEB_EXTRACT, COST_JSON_REPAIR) but descriptions do not mention cost or rate limits. LLMs cannot reason about financial consequences.