Production-grade enterprise multi-tenant agent sandbox security guard. Enforces strict memory boundary separation and prevents cross-tenant credential leakage.
Single tool with critical definition gaps. Tool name 'enforce_tenant_isolation' lacks action verb clarity (enforce is vague, does it create, validate, or apply isolation?). Description is present (94 chars) but generic and lacks WHEN/WHY guidance. Input schema visible but parameters lack descriptions entirely, tenant_id and execution_payload have no guidance on format, constraints, or expected values. Output schema undocumented; response structure inferred from code only. No error handling guidance. Tool appears to be a security/validation function but this is not explicit in the definition.
Enforces cryptographic multi-tenant sandbox boundaries for enterprise agents.
Input parameters lack descriptions. tenant_id and execution_payload have no guidance on format, constraints, or valid values. LLMs cannot infer whether tenant_id is a UUID, email domain, or opaque string; what execution_payload structure is required; or what happens if cross_tenant_token is present.
Output schema not documented. Response structure (sandbox_status, tenant_scope_token, cross_tenant_leak_detected, etc.) is inferred from code only. LLMs cannot plan downstream actions or extract required fields without seeing the schema.
Tool name 'enforce_tenant_isolation' is vague. Does it validate, apply, create, or verify isolation? A clearer name like 'validate_tenant_isolation' or 'check_tenant_boundary' would signal intent. Current name conflates multiple possible actions.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | F | 32 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
No error handling guidance. Code checks for cross-tenant leakage but returns a status field rather than actionable error messages. If leak_detected=true, what should the LLM do? Retry? Escalate? Quarantine? No guidance provided.
Default execution_payload contains hardcoded example values (user_prompt, org_domain, private_api_key). LLMs may reuse these literal values in real calls instead of adapting to actual context, causing failures or security issues.