MCP server for AgentID agent coordination platform. Provides tools for persistent memory (write_memory, read_memory, search_memory), mission tracking (start_mission, update_status, read_mission), agent handoffs, and activity reporting. Enables multi-agent workflows with shared identity and memory.
Server defines 9 tools with clear verb-noun naming (write_memory, read_memory, search_memory, start_mission, update_status, read_mission, handoff, report_activity, get_secret). All tools have descriptions (10-100 chars, baseline 194 chars). Input schemas are visible with typed parameters and descriptions. However, output schemas are not documented, critical for LLM planning. Parameter descriptions are minimal (10-30 chars vs baseline 72 chars). No error handling guidance, no enum constraints, no pagination support for list operations. Security concern: get_secret accepts a 'name' parameter but no validation or rate-limiting is evident. Tool composition is reasonable but lacks idempotency guarantees and confirmation patterns for destructive ops (handoff, update_status).
Retrieve a stored API key or secret from AgentID Drive without exposing it in prompts or config
Hand off a mission to another agent with context and notes
Retrieve a fact by exact key from persistent memory
Read mission details by ID, or list all active missions if no ID provided
Report a summary of activity completed in this session
Find relevant facts by meaning/semantic search in persistent memory
Create a new mission with a title and goal for task tracking
Output schemas not documented. LLMs cannot plan downstream tool calls or extract required fields (e.g., mission_id returned by start_mission, secret value from get_secret). This breaks tool chaining.
Parameter descriptions are minimal (10-30 chars vs baseline 72 chars). 'status' in update_status lacks enum constraint, LLM may pass invalid values. 'query' in search_memory lacks semantic guidance.
No error handling guidance. Tools return success/failure but do not tell LLM what to do on error (retry? ask user? abort?). No recovery paths documented.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | D | 53 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
Update the status of a mission and add notes
Store a fact under a named key in persistent memory
Destructive operations (handoff, update_status) lack confirmation or dry-run patterns. Agent mistakes could silently hand off missions or corrupt status without user approval.
get_secret accepts arbitrary 'name' parameter with no validation, rate-limiting, or audit trail visible. Secrets are sensitive, missing access controls and logging create compliance risk.