This is a reference implementation for a security-focused MCP gateway, not a production agent tool server. Tool definitions are present with schemas and descriptions, but many lack LLM-optimized clarity. 15 of 25 tools have descriptions under 100 chars (baseline 194 chars). Parameter descriptions are sparse or generic. Tools like 'tools/list' and 'tools/call' are meta-gateway operations, not domain tools. Security-focused tools (authenticate, evaluate_authorization, emit_receipt) have good descriptions but are infrastructure, not user-facing. Sandbox/demo tools (fs_delete, make_plan, make_allow) lack production-grade error handling and validation guidance. No tool declares permissions or scope requirements. Output schemas are not documented. Error handling is minimal, no recovery guidance or actionable error messages visible in definitions.

• Add output schemas to all tools. Document the structure of receipts, verdicts, and plans so LLMs know what fields to extract and pass downstream.
• Expand descriptions to 100-200 chars. For each tool, answer: What does it do? When should the agent call it? What does it return? Example: 'emit_receipt: Record a tamper-evident receipt of an authorization decision. Call after tools/call to create an audit trail. Returns receipt_hash for verification.'
• Declare permissions for each tool. Add a 'permissions' field to tool definitions (e.g., permissions: ['admin:incident', 'write:audit']). This enables least-privilege agent configuration.
• Add validation constraints to parameter descriptions. For fs_delete, state: 'path must be under /tmp/csp_sandbox and must not contain .. or symlinks.' For risk, state: 'must be one of: LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, CRITICAL.'
• Add error handling guidance. For each tool, document common errors and recovery steps. Example: 'If token validation fails, return error code AUTH_INVALID with message: "Token expired or malformed. Request a fresh token from the auth service."'