HTTP + MCP server for post-action evidence verification with HMAC-attested receipts. Verifies AI agent action claims against supplied evidence and issues content-addressed receipts.
Single tool 'verify_action' has a well-structured schema with all required parameters typed and described. Tool name is clear and action-oriented (verify_*). Description is comprehensive (194 chars) and explains the purpose, when to use it, and what it returns. Input schema includes claim, evidence, kind, context, and caller_context with proper type definitions and descriptions. However, output schema is not explicitly documented in the visible code, the description mentions 'verdict, reasoning, confidence, verifier_used, receipt' but no formal JSON Schema for the response is shown. Error handling guidance is minimal. The tool is READ_ONLY (good security posture) but lacks explicit error recovery patterns.
Verify an AI agent's claim about an action against supplied evidence. Returns a consistency check (supplied evidence vs claim) plus an HMAC-attested receipt.
Output schema not formally documented. Description mentions 'verdict, reasoning, confidence, verifier_used, receipt' but no JSON Schema definition is visible for the response structure. LLMs cannot reliably parse or chain on undocumented output.
Error handling lacks recovery guidance. No documented error codes, categories (retryable vs fatal), or actionable next steps. If verification fails, the LLM has no guidance on what to do next.
Parameter 'kind' accepts free-form string with optional override values (code_diff, db_op, file_op, api_call, generic) but is not declared as an enum. LLMs may hallucinate invalid kind values.
No pagination or result limits documented. If 'evidence' object is very large or deeply nested, no guidance on maximum size or truncation behavior.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | C | 66 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
Tool composition: single tool does one thing well, but no companion tools for related operations (e.g., retrieve_receipt, list_verifications). Limited composability for multi-step agent workflows.