A local-first personal intelligence system built on the DeepSeek Harness agent runtime
Telos exposes 3 workspace tools with complete input schemas and reasonable descriptions (avg 95 chars). All parameters are typed and described. However, output schemas are not documented, error handling lacks recovery guidance, and descriptions could be more LLM-optimized. Tool naming follows verb_noun convention (workspace_list, workspace_read, workspace_write) but lacks clarity on authorization scope and failure modes. No tool annotations (readOnlyHint/destructiveHint) despite clear risk profiles.
List files and directories inside one authorized root of the current multi-root workspace.
Read one UTF-8 file from an authorized root of the current multi-root workspace.
Create or replace one UTF-8 file inside an authorized root. Read existing files first and pass their revision; use expected_revision="new" only for a new path.
Output schemas not documented. LLMs cannot plan downstream calls or extract required fields (e.g., does workspace_list return file sizes, modification times, or just names?).
Error handling lacks recovery guidance. No indication of what to do if root_id is invalid, path is not found, or write fails due to revision mismatch. Bare error codes force LLM guessing.
Tool annotations missing. workspace_write is destructive (WRITE risk) but lacks destructiveHint annotation. workspace_list and workspace_read are read-only but lack readOnlyHint. Agents cannot infer safety properties.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | F | 49 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
workspace_write description mentions 'revision' but does not explain what happens on mismatch (conflict? overwrite? error?). Undocumented parameter relationships cause silent misuse.
No pagination or result limits documented. workspace_list could return thousands of files; no indication of max results, offset/limit params, or total count. Large results risk context window exhaustion.