CCS Runtime Evidence MCP Server — 7-dimension runtime verification for AI agent tool calls. Ed25519 receipts, sub-ms OOP, zero deps. For Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf.
Three tools with partial schemas and descriptions. verify_tool_call and issue_evidence have input schemas with parameter descriptions, but descriptions are generic (under 100 chars). audit_mcp_config has minimal schema detail. No output schemas documented. No error handling guidance. Tool names are action-oriented (verify_, issue_, audit_) but descriptions lack WHEN/WHY context. Parameters lack enums, ranges, or format constraints. No mention of idempotency, side effects, or recovery paths.
Audit an MCP server configuration for security risks
Issue a signed CCS evidence record (allow + deny)
Verify a tool call against CCS 7 dimensions + semantic + math
No output schemas documented for any tool. LLMs cannot infer what fields to expect or plan downstream calls.
Tool descriptions are under 100 characters and lack WHEN/WHY context. 'Verify a tool call against CCS 7 dimensions + semantic + math' does not explain when to call this vs other verification tools or what the output enables.
Parameters lack enums, ranges, or format constraints. 'verdict' accepts 'allow' or 'deny' but no enum declared. 'policy' is a free-form object with no schema or validation guidance.
No error handling guidance. If verification fails, what should the LLM do? Retry? Ask the user? No recovery paths documented.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | F | 47 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
issue_evidence is a WRITE tool (modifies state by issuing signed records) but description does not warn of side effects or idempotency guarantees. Agents need to know if retrying is safe.