ContextVC exposes 22 tools with basic descriptions and parameter schemas, but falls short of production quality. Most tool descriptions are terse (10-50 chars), leaving LLMs without clear selection guidance. Parameter schemas are present but lack depth: no enums for constrained inputs (e.g., 'json' boolean flags appear in 10+ tools but are never explained), no min/max bounds on numeric parameters, and no guidance on parameter relationships or dependencies. Error handling is minimal, no recovery guidance, no categorization of retryable vs fatal errors. Tool naming is reasonable (verb_noun pattern mostly followed), but composition issues exist: 'review_accept' and 'review_reject' are tightly coupled; 'log_event' and 'harvest' both manipulate state but lack idempotency guarantees. Output schemas are not documented, callers cannot predict what fields to expect. Security: no evidence of permission gates, audit trails, or secret injection patterns despite tools like 'doctor' and 'merge' that modify state.
Import drift or existing agent files into objects
Backfill codemap from git history
Query knowledge object provenance
Get context brief for a task or prompt
CI guard: lockfile freshness and drift verification
Diff knowledge objects across versions
Diagnose and optionally repair local ContextVC wiring
Load a knowledge object by ID
Descriptions are too terse (avg 35-50 chars). LLMs cannot determine when to select tools or what they return. Baseline for A+ tools is 194 chars; ContextVC averages ~40 chars.
No output schemas documented. Callers cannot predict response structure, forcing LLMs to guess field names and types. This breaks tool chaining and wastes tokens on discovery.
No enums for constrained inputs. 'json' boolean appears in 10+ tools but is never explained. 'scope' accepts free-form strings with no pattern guidance. LLMs will hallucinate invalid values.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | F | 44 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
Harvest session events into proposals
Knowledge timeline
Append event to ledger
Run semantic merge over .context/objects
Gate precheck for file or command execution
Render projection targets from objects
Revert a knowledge object to previous state
Accept a proposal
Review proposal queue
Reject a proposal
Search knowledge objects by query with optional scope filtering
Temporarily suppress a gate hit
Show context health summary
Staleness verification of bindings
State-modifying tools (log_event, adopt_drift, render, merge, doctor, review_accept, review_reject, revert, snooze) lack idempotency guarantees and error recovery guidance. No confirmation step for destructive ops.
No permission gates, audit trails, or secret injection patterns visible. Tools like 'doctor --fix' and 'merge' modify critical state without documented access control or logging.