A coding agent that uses LLMs to understand and modify codebases, with support for multiple LLM providers and tool-based interactions
Critical gaps across all dimensions. Tool descriptions are extremely brief (5-30 chars, well below the 10-1024 baseline). Input schemas are minimal, most tools expose only a single string parameter with no type constraints, enums, or validation guidance. No output schemas documented. Parameter descriptions are generic ('File path to read', 'Search pattern') without format constraints, ranges, or examples. No error handling guidance. Dangerous tools (bash, shell, edit, write) lack confirmation patterns or dry-run support. Tool composition is poor: 'subagent' and 'agent' are near-duplicates with different parameter names ('agent' vs 'name'), forcing LLM disambiguation. No pagination, no result limits, no chaining IDs in responses. Security concerns: bash/shell/edit/write expose irreversible operations without safeguards; no audit trail or permission gates visible.
Dispatch an agent for nested tool execution (synonym for subagent)
Execute bash commands
Edit file contents
Find files matching criteria
Find files matching glob pattern
Search for patterns in files
List directory contents
Read file contents
Descriptions critically short (5-30 chars vs 10-1024 baseline). 'Read file contents', 'List directory contents' lack context for LLM selection, when to use, or what happens on error.
Input schemas minimal: single string parameters with no type constraints, enums, ranges, or format specifications. No validation guidance for LLM. E.g., 'path' param lacks min/max length, allowed characters, or examples.
No output schemas documented. LLMs cannot plan downstream calls or extract required fields. No pagination, result limits, or chaining IDs (e.g., ls should return file metadata with paths for downstream read/edit calls).
Inferred effective spec: <=2025-11-25.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | F | 35 | <=2025-11-25 | v2 |
Execute shell commands
Dispatch a sub-agent for nested tool execution
Write file contents
Dangerous tools (bash, shell, edit, write) lack confirmation patterns, dry-run support, or error recovery guidance. Agents can execute irreversible commands without safeguards. No audit trail or permission gates visible.
Duplicate tools with inconsistent naming: 'subagent' (param 'agent') vs 'agent' (param 'name'). Forces LLM disambiguation and increases error likelihood. Violates single-responsibility principle.