MCP Server for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Auction Mechanism Skill - Pure Python Standard Library implementation of VCG truthful mechanism design. Calculates socially optimal resource allocation and Clarke pivot rule payments, guaranteeing that truthful valuation bidding is a weakly dominant strategy (DSIC).
Single tool with minimal definition quality. Tool name 'run_vcg_auction' violates verb_noun convention (should be 'execute_vcg_auction' or similar). Description is present but generic (108 chars, below 194-char baseline). Input schema exists but lacks proper JSON Schema structure, parameters have type and description but no formal constraints (enums, min/max). No output schema documented. No error handling guidance. No parameter validation rules stated. Tool does not follow the 54 Agentic Tool Patterns for production-grade tools.
Execute Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction mechanism for single-item or multi-unit auctions with truthful dominant strategy guarantees
Tool name 'run_vcg_auction' is generic and does not follow verb_noun convention. 'run' is vague, does not clearly convey the auction execution action. Should be 'execute_vcg_auction' or 'conduct_vcg_auction'.
No output schema documented. LLMs cannot plan downstream operations or extract fields from results. The code returns a dict with fields like 'winner', 'payment', 'allocations', but this structure is not declared in the tool definition.
Input parameters lack formal constraints. 'items' is an array with no minItems/maxItems. 'bids' is an object with no schema for values (should specify number type, min/max). 'units' is integer with no minimum (should be >= 1). Unbounded parameters invite invalid LLM inputs.
No error handling guidance. Tool does not document what happens if bids is empty, units exceeds items, or invalid data is passed. No recovery hints for LLMs.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | F | 34 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
Parameter descriptions are minimal and lack actionable detail. 'Dictionary mapping agent identifiers to their bid amounts' does not specify: are bids floats or integers? What is the valid range? Can bids be negative or zero? LLMs must guess.