Execution authority layer for AI agents — ALLOW / REQUIRE_CONFIRM / BLOCK policy gate before tool calls, browser actions, or agent executions
Three tools with basic schemas and descriptions, but significant gaps in parameter documentation and error handling. read_file and send_email have minimal descriptions (under 50 chars). delete_database lacks any safety warnings despite being destructive. No output schemas documented. Parameters lack format constraints, ranges, or validation guidance. No error recovery patterns. Tool composition is reasonable (single responsibility), but descriptions do not explain WHEN to use each tool or what happens on failure.
Drop a database table
Read file contents from the workspace
Send an email to a recipient
Destructive tool (delete_database) lacks safety warnings, confirmation pattern, or dry-run capability. Description is only 24 chars and does not warn of irreversible consequences.
No output schemas documented. LLMs cannot predict what fields to expect from tool responses, forcing them to parse unstructured text and breaking downstream tool chaining.
Parameter descriptions lack format constraints, ranges, or validation rules. 'path' does not specify allowed characters or max length; 'to' does not validate email format; 'table' does not explain naming conventions.
Tool descriptions are too brief (24 - 50 chars) and lack context for LLM selection. Do not explain WHEN to use each tool, what prerequisites exist, or what happens on failure.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | D | 51 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
No error handling or recovery guidance. Responses are mocked; real implementation must return actionable error messages (e.g., 'File not found. Check path syntax: /workspace/src/...') and classify errors as retryable or fatal.