Tamper-evident audit-log aggregator with hash-chained attestation. Exposes scan() as an MCP tool for Cognis.Studio.
Single tool 'auditrail_scan' has a basic description (89 chars) but critically lacks parameter descriptions. The input schema defines 'target' as a string with a description, but the tool description does not explain what constitutes a valid target (file path? log entry? directory?), when to use this tool, or what the JSON output structure contains. No output schema is documented. The tool name 'auditrail_scan' is reasonably verb-forward but the description does not clarify prerequisites, error conditions, or recovery paths. Baseline: 100% of A+ tools have documented return types and parameter descriptions; this tool has neither.
Tamper-evident audit-log aggregator with hash-chained attestation. Returns JSON findings.
Missing output schema documentation. Tool returns JSON findings but no schema is documented for the response structure. LLMs cannot plan downstream operations or extract fields without knowing what the output contains.
Parameter 'target' lacks actionable description. Current description 'Target path or input for audit log scanning' is vague. Does it accept file paths, URLs, log entry IDs, or raw JSON? What format? What are valid examples? LLMs will guess and pass invalid values.
Tool description does not explain when to use it or what it does with the target. 'Tamper-evident audit-log aggregator with hash-chained attestation' is domain-specific jargon. Rewrite for LLM clarity: 'Scans an audit log file or directory and verifies integrity using hash-chain validation. Returns a manifest with event count, integrity status, and any detected tampering.'
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | F | 49 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
No error handling guidance. Tool description does not explain what errors are possible (file not found, invalid format, tampering detected) or how the LLM should respond. Should it retry? Ask the user? Escalate?
STDIO transport only. Server is not remotely accessible and cannot be used by hosted MCP clients. This is a hard architectural limitation, not a definition quality issue, but it severely limits production utility.