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Deterministic MCP Security Architecture. FrozenNamespace as Root of Trust for Model Context Protocol tool verification.
Both tools have only 1-3 parameters with basic type info but lack depth on constraints, error cases, and recovery guidance. No output schemas documented. No error handling patterns visible. No tool annotations (readOnlyHint/destructiveHint). Naming is acceptable (verb_noun), but descriptions fail to explain WHEN to use each tool or what happens on failure.
Read a text file from the project directory.
Send an email.
Provides no context on when to use, what happens on failure, or whether it's idempotent. LLM cannot determine if retry is safe.
No output schemas documented for either tool. LLMs cannot plan downstream calls or extract required fields (e.g., does read_file return file_content, encoding, line_count?). Does send_email return message_id, timestamp, or status?
No error handling guidance. If read_file hits a permission error or file not found, what should the LLM do? If send_email fails (invalid recipient, SMTP timeout), is it retryable? No recovery patterns present.
send_email lacks destructiveHint annotation. This is a WRITE tool that modifies external state (sends email), but no tool annotation signals this to the client. Agents cannot distinguish safe (read_file) from risky (send_email) operations.
Inferred effective spec: <=2025-11-25.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | F | 43 | <=2025-11-25 | v2 |
read_file description (47 chars) is below production baseline (194 chars avg). Does not explain: What file types are supported? What is the max file size? What encoding is assumed? When should this be called vs. a resource URI?