Deterministic risk-decision engine + Agent Settlement Protocol (ASP/1.0) exposed as MCP tools. Zero-LLM, same-inputs-same-decision. HTTP 402 payment discipline built in.
Quesen defines 5 tools with clear, domain-specific descriptions (avg 156 chars). Tool names use verb_noun pattern (validate, simulate, report, health, version). However, input schemas are partially visible: quesen.validate has a comprehensive schema with 14 parameters, but quesen.simulate, quesen.report, quesen.health, and quesen.version lack visible detailed parameter schemas in the provided source. Descriptions are strong and actionable, but parameter-level descriptions are sparse or missing for nested objects. No output schemas documented. Error handling guidance absent. Security considerations (API keys, permissions) not addressed in tool definitions.
Liveness probe. Returns engine_version and transport metadata.
Post-decision outcome feedback. Accepts request_id + outcome and feeds the Conflict Matrix admission pipeline.
Counterfactual scoring. Compare the baseline decision against a simulated decision with optional weight and threshold overrides. Sandbox only.
Deterministic pre-decision risk validation for autonomous agents. Returns PROCEED / REVIEW / SKIP with a risk_score in [0.0, 1.0], a confidence in [0.0, 1.0], and the exact conflict rules that fired.
Full engine configuration — weights, thresholds, protocol version, feature flags.
Output schemas not documented for any tool. LLMs cannot plan downstream calls or extract required fields without knowing response structure.
Nested object parameters (policy, subject, action, target, tool, permissions, data, signals, provenance in quesen.validate) lack field-level descriptions. LLMs cannot infer required subfields or their formats.
quesen.health and quesen.version have empty input schemas ({}). No parameter descriptions provided. Unclear what these tools return or when to call them.
No error handling guidance. Tool descriptions do not explain failure modes, recovery steps, or when to retry vs. escalate.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | C | 60 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
API key handling not documented in tool definitions. Security pattern (secret-injection) not visible, unclear if keys are passed as parameters (anti-pattern) or injected server-side.