Umbrella MCP shim for HiveAttest — perimeter for autonomous agents. Exposes all C8/C12/C13/C15-C20 attestation primitives as MCP tools. Reference implementation of USPTO Provisional 64/055,601.
HiveAttest exposes 16 cryptographic attestation tools with complete input schemas and detailed descriptions. All tools have proper JSON Schema definitions with required fields, enums, and type constraints. Descriptions are substantive (150-250 chars) and reference C-codes (C15-C20). However, output schemas are entirely undocumented, no tool declares what fields it returns, forcing LLMs to guess response structure. Error handling is absent: no guidance on retryability, user-fixable vs fatal errors, or recovery paths. Tool naming follows verb_noun pattern (attest_*) consistently but lacks action clarity, 'attest_gate_evaluate' is domain-specific jargon; 'check_access' would be clearer. Parameter descriptions are strong (e.g., 'Declared taint status' with enum), but no guidance on parameter relationships (e.g., when is 'observed_inputs' required vs optional in verify tools?). Security posture is unclear: no mention of credential injection, permission gates, or audit logging.
Verify an absence proof: confirm that a resource was NOT present at a given time (C12: hive-absence). Checks timestamp, signature, and absence claim. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Register a versioned cargo type in the HiveAttest registry (C17: hive-cargo-taxonomy). Pins a definition hash for version-anchoring. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Get a registry snapshot with Merkle root for version pinning (C17). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Validate a payload against a registered cargo type schema (C17). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Append a node to a custody chain (C16: hive-custody). Taint propagates: once tainted, always tainted. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
No output schemas documented. Tools declare inputs but not return types. LLMs cannot plan downstream calls or extract required fields (e.g., warranty_id from issue response, proof structure from custody_proof). Forces trial-and-error response parsing.
No error handling guidance. Tools do not document failure modes, retryability, or recovery paths. An LLM receiving a signature verification failure has no guidance on whether to retry, ask the user, or abort.
Parameter relationships undocumented. 'observed_inputs' in attest_passport_verify is marked optional but semantics unclear: when should it be provided? What happens if omitted? Undocumented dependencies cause silent misuse.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | C | 66 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
Retrieve a Merkle inclusion proof for a specific node in a custody chain (C16). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Verify a custody chain: hash linkage, Ed25519 signatures, and taint propagation (C16). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
THE HEADLINE TOOL. Evaluate whether an agent may proceed through the HiveAttest gate (C19: hive-gate-enforcer). Verifies passport signature + expiry, cargo registry membership, and warranty status. Every response (allow OR deny) includes a signed C18-format receipt of the gate decision. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inspect a payload: extract declared fields, compute hashes, and optionally validate against a cargo schema (C20: hive-inspect). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Retrieve server metadata: version, layer, patent, claims, and supported C-codes. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Issue a Pre-Action Attestation Manifest (C15: hive-passport). Signs with Ed25519 over RFC 8785 JCS-canonical body. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Verify a Pre-Action Attestation Manifest (C15: hive-passport). Checks Ed25519 signature, temporal validity, and optionally observed inputs hash. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Verify a smash.prov signature (C8: smash.prov). Checks Ed25519 signature, timestamp freshness (±300s), and payload integrity. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Report a warranty breach. Marks the warranty as breached and returns a signed breach record (C18). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Retrieve a warranty by ID (C18). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Issue an attestation warranty committing an agent to a claim (C18: hive-attestation-warranty). Signed with Ed25519. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Tool naming uses domain jargon ('attest_gate_evaluate', 'attest_custody_append') that obscures intent. LLMs struggle with unfamiliar terminology. 'check_access', 'add_chain_node', 'verify_signature' would be clearer.
No security documentation. Tools handle cryptographic operations and sensitive attestations but do not declare permissions (e.g., 'requires: sign_attestation'), audit requirements, or credential injection strategy.