Three tools with basic schemas and descriptions, but significant gaps in parameter documentation, error handling, and security. search_internet lacks input validation and error recovery guidance. manage_local_file exposes destructive operations without confirmation patterns or permission checks. generate_custom_ui accepts arbitrary Python code execution, a critical security vulnerability. No tool annotations (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint). Descriptions are present but generic (avg 120 chars, below 194-char baseline). Parameters lack constraints (enums, ranges, format specs). No output schemas documented. Error messages are generic strings rather than structured recovery guidance.

• Add tool annotations: @mcp.tool(readOnlyHint=true) for search_internet; @mcp.tool(destructiveHint=true) for manage_local_file. Agents need explicit safety signals.
• Refactor manage_local_file to require explicit confirmation for delete operations. Implement a two-step pattern: preview_file_deletion(filepath) → confirm_file_deletion(filepath, confirmation_token). Prevents accidental data loss.
• Replace generate_custom_ui's exec() with a restricted AST-based code validator. Allowlist safe prefab_ui imports; reject os, subprocess, __import__, eval, exec. Or use a sandboxed Python environment (RestrictedPython library).
• Add enum constraint to manage_local_file 'action' parameter: action: Literal['read', 'create', 'update', 'delete']. Return structured error: {error: 'invalid_action', got: 'delete_all', valid: ['read', 'create', 'update', 'delete']}.
• Document output schemas for all tools. search_internet should return {results: [{title, url, content}], total_count}. manage_local_file should return {status: 'success'|'error', message, file_path}. generate_custom_ui should return {app: PrefabApp, error?: string}.