Critical gaps across all dimensions. Tool definitions are inferred from package.json command metadata, not explicit MCP tool registrations. No input schemas visible in source code. Descriptions are minimal (6-30 chars), far below the 50-200 char baseline for LLM-optimized tools. Parameters lack type definitions and constraints. No output schemas documented. File-system tools (bash, read, write, edit, grep, glob) present severe security risks with no input validation, sanitization, or permission gates. OpenSIN-specific tools (dispatch, swarm.create, memory.consolidate, etc.) lack implementation details and error handling guidance.

• Define explicit MCP tool schemas with JSON Schema for all 16 tools. Include type, description, and constraints for every parameter. Example: bash should require 'command' (string, max 2048 chars, no shell metacharacters without escaping) and optional 'timeout' (integer, 1-300 seconds).
• Expand tool descriptions to 50-200 chars. Include WHAT the tool does, WHEN to use it, and any prerequisites. Example: 'Execute bash commands in the workspace. Use for file operations, builds, or system queries. Commands run with workspace permissions; no sudo or network access.' Current: 'Execute bash commands' (23 chars).
• Add parameter descriptions for all tools. Example: read tool should document 'path' as 'Absolute or relative file path within workspace. Must not traverse outside workspace root (../../../ blocked).'
• Implement input validation and sanitization. For bash: reject shell metacharacters (|, &, ;, $(), backticks) unless explicitly escaped. For file tools: validate paths are within workspace, reject symlinks to external targets, enforce read-only on 'read' tool.
• Add error handling with recovery guidance. Example: 'File not found at /path/to/file. Available files in /path: [list]. Try glob("path/**/*.ext") to search.' Categorize errors as retryable (timeout, rate limit) vs fatal (permission denied, invalid path).