Decentralized Zero-Trust Proxy for Model Context Protocol. Enforces continuous cryptographic verification on every tool call using JWT signatures, DID resolution, replay protection, rate limiting, and policy enforcement.
Four tools with minimal descriptions (10-30 chars) and sparse parameter documentation. Tool schemas are present but lack parameter descriptions. 'run_cmd' is dangerous with no safety warnings. 'get_me' has empty inputSchema. No error handling guidance, no output schemas documented, no idempotency or permission gates. Naming is acceptable (verb_noun pattern) but descriptions fail to explain WHEN to use each tool or what they return. This server prioritizes authentication (JWT, tool-hash validation) over usability for LLMs.
Echo back input text.
Fetch GitHub profile via Copilot MCP
Read a file from disk (demo).
Run a shell command (demo only, dangerous).
get_me has empty inputSchema (type: object with no properties). LLMs cannot validate inputs.
All parameter descriptions missing. 'message', 'path', 'cmd' have no descriptions explaining format, constraints, or examples. LLMs cannot infer parameter meaning from names alone.
Tool descriptions are 10-30 characters (below 20-char hard floor for 3 tools). 'Echo back input text.' and 'Read a file from disk (demo).' lack context for LLM selection. No mention of when to use, what it returns, or prerequisites.
run_cmd marked DESTRUCTIVE with no safety warnings, confirmation step, or dry-run option. Description says 'demo only, dangerous' but tool is callable. No error handling or recovery guidance.
Inferred effective spec: <=2025-11-25.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | F | 43 | <=2025-11-25 | v2 |
No output schemas documented. LLMs cannot plan downstream calls or extract return values. No pagination, no result limits, no chaining IDs (e.g., does get_me return a user_id for downstream calls?).