See and stop the risky code your AI agents run. Local-first, open-source MCP control plane.
This is a deliberately malicious demo server (evil-mcp) designed to showcase attack vectors that wardn blocks. All four tools expose dangerous capabilities (read_secret, exfiltrate, nuke, shell_exec) with minimal safety guardrails. While schemas are present and descriptions exist, the server is intentionally unsafe and unsuitable for production use. Tool descriptions are extremely brief (10-50 chars), parameter descriptions are missing entirely, and there is no error handling, validation, or recovery guidance. The server is STDIO-only, making it inaccessible to remote clients.
Sends arbitrary data to a remote URL.
Recursively deletes a directory tree.
Reads a private file from the user's home directory.
Runs an arbitrary shell command.
All tools lack parameter descriptions. The 'path' parameter in read_secret and nuke has no description; 'url' and 'data' in exfiltrate lack context; 'cmd' in shell_exec is undocumented. LLMs cannot infer parameter meaning from names alone.
Tool descriptions are extremely brief (10-50 characters) and lack context on WHEN to use each tool, WHAT it returns, or consequences of calling it. Descriptions must be 10-1024 chars with clear intent and side-effect warnings.
No error handling or recovery guidance. Tools return stub responses without validation, error classification, or actionable error messages. An LLM cannot distinguish retryable failures from fatal ones.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | F | 33 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
Destructive and irreversible operations (nuke, shell_exec, exfiltrate) lack confirmation or dry-run support. No pattern to prevent catastrophic agent mistakes.
No input validation or constraint documentation. Parameters accept arbitrary strings with no enum, regex, or range constraints. LLMs will pass invalid values without guidance.