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Production-grade MCP server for ZIP archives on the zero-dependency zipnative engine: deterministic, reproducible creation (store / deflate, worker-parallel, streamed sources), listing and inspection without extracting, random-access entry reads, secure-by-default extraction (zip-slip, zip-bomb, symlink, duplicate-path and device-name refusals), one-call deep verification, forward scanning of truncated or unseekable streams, incremental modification without recompression, CRC-32, bounded raw-DEFLATE inflation, ISO/IEC 21320-1 conformance validated in CI, MCP resources for sandbox files, and human-in-the-loop AI-governance issue drafting.
zipnative-mcp demonstrates solid definition quality with comprehensive tool coverage for ZIP operations. All 13 tools have descriptions (avg 156 chars, within 10-1024 baseline) and explicit input schemas with typed parameters. Naming follows verb_noun convention (create_zip, extract_zip, inspect_zip, etc.). However, several tools lack parameter-level descriptions in their schemas, and output schemas are not documented. Error handling descriptions are minimal, tools do not guide recovery or categorize errors as retryable/user-fixable. The governance tool (draft_governance_issue) is underdocumented relative to its sensitivity. Security-critical tools (extract_zip, create_zip) have good attack-surface documentation in descriptions but lack explicit permission gates or audit trail guidance.
Compute CRC-32 checksum of data using the IEEE 802.3 polynomial.
Create a deterministic, reproducible ZIP archive from entries with configurable compression (store/deflate), worker-parallel processing, streamed sources, and optional file-mode output.
Describe the zipnative engine version, server version, and tool API version.
Draft a human-in-the-loop AI-governance issue for review and approval before execution.
Securely extract ZIP entries with secure-by-default guards against zip-slip, zip-bomb, symlink, duplicate-path and device-name attacks.
Decompress raw DEFLATE data with bounded output size to prevent zip-bomb attacks.
Inspect ZIP archive structure and metadata without extracting, with eager validation of entry overlaps and consistency.
Output schemas not documented. Tools return structured data but LLMs cannot plan downstream calls without knowing response field names and types. Affects all 13 tools.
Parameter descriptions missing or minimal in schemas. 'entries' array in create_zip lacks detail on structure (filename, data, compression per-entry?). 'fields' array in inspect_zip/verify_zip/list_zip_entries not explained. LLMs cannot construct valid payloads.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | C | 62 | 2025-06-18+ | v2 |
List ZIP entries lazily without full validation, supporting pagination and filtering.
Incrementally modify a ZIP archive (append, rename, remove entries) without recompression.
Read a single ZIP entry by random access with optional range support and inline/file output modes.
Sanitize ZIP entry paths to prevent zip-slip, device-name, and duplicate-path attacks.
Forward scan a ZIP archive from an unseekable or truncated stream, supporting incremental processing.
Perform one-call deep verification of ZIP integrity including CRC-32 checks, format validation, and conformance to ISO/IEC 21320-1.
Error handling does not guide recovery. Tools document security mitigations (zip-slip, zip-bomb) but do not explain what happens on failure or how to retry. No categorization of errors as retryable vs fatal.
draft_governance_issue tool underdocumented. Description is vague ('Draft a human-in-the-loop AI-governance issue'). No explanation of what 'action' and 'context' fields should contain, what approval flow looks like, or what happens after drafting.
No permission gates or audit trail guidance. Security-critical tools (extract_zip, create_zip, modify_zip) lack explicit scope declarations or logging recommendations. Agents cannot determine if they have authority to call these tools.