Least-privilege permissions for AI agents and MCP tools. Record what your agent does, auto-generate a safe policy, and block dangerous tool calls before they happen.
AgentPerms is a security policy framework, not a production MCP server. The bundled vulnerable-mcp-demo is intentionally over-privileged for testing. Tool definitions are minimal: 8 tools with bare descriptions (10-50 chars, well below the 194-char baseline) and schemas lacking parameter descriptions entirely. No error handling, no output schema documentation, no security annotations. The demo server echoes tool calls rather than executing them. This is a teaching tool, not a production-grade MCP implementation.
Create a GitHub issue.
Delete a GitHub repo (DANGEROUS).
Run a shell command (DANGEROUS).
Force-push over history (DANGEROUS).
List GitHub repos.
Read a file from disk.
Send an email (DANGEROUS).
All parameter descriptions missing. Schema defines properties but provides no guidance on what each parameter controls, expected format, or constraints. LLMs cannot infer parameter semantics from names alone.
Tool descriptions are 10 - 50 characters (well below 194-char baseline). Descriptions lack context on WHEN to use each tool, WHAT it returns, and any prerequisites. E.g., 'Read a file from disk' does not explain path format, error handling, or size limits.
No output schema documented. Tools return generic text echoes; LLMs cannot plan downstream calls or extract structured data. Production tools must document return types and field names.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | F | 41 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
Write a file to disk.
No error handling or recovery guidance. Tools do not indicate which errors are retryable, user-fixable, or fatal. No actionable error messages to guide LLM recovery.
Destructive tools (delete_repo, force_push, exec, send_email) lack confirmation or dry-run support. No permission gates or audit trail. Agents can invoke irreversible operations without safeguards.