MCP server for agent-browser: bridge + control plane + Streamable HTTP MCP + Claude CLI auth tools. General-purpose AI browser-control platform (MV3 extension + MCP server). Stealth-first: no CDP.
Four tools with clear action verbs and detailed descriptions (100-200 chars each). All have input schemas with types and descriptions. agent_browser_act is particularly well-designed with enum constraints (action, robust) and parameter relationships documented. However, output schemas are not explicitly documented in the source code, only inferred from descriptions. No error handling guidance or recovery patterns visible. Missing tool annotations (readOnlyHint/destructiveHint). Risk classifications are present but not formally integrated into tool metadata.
DO an action on the active page by accessible name — click a button, type into an input, submit a form, etc. Finds the first matching element (role + name), performs the action, waits for the page to settle, and returns the post-action accessibility-tree snapshot. No ref/snapshot-generation bookkeeping needed — this tool handles it. Pair with agent_browser_visit (read) for the full read-and-do agentic loop. Policy-gated; sensitive actions on untrusted domains escalate.
Make sure the stealth Chrome + extension are running and the bridge is connected, launching the browser via the host helper if needed. Idempotent. Use this before any agent_browser_visit / advanced browser_* calls.
Status of the persistent agent browser (stealth Chrome + extension bridge). Returns whether the SW bridge is connected, the active tab URL, host-helper reachability. No side effects.
Navigate the persistent agent browser to a URL (policy-gated), wait for it to settle, and return a compact accessibility-tree snapshot. Auto-ensures the browser is running first. Use this for read/observe tasks.
Output schemas not documented. Descriptions mention 'accessibility-tree snapshot' but no structured schema is visible in source code. LLMs cannot plan downstream tool calls without knowing response field names and types.
No error handling guidance. Descriptions lack recovery hints (e.g., 'If browser fails to start, check host-helper status'). Agents cannot self-correct on failures.
Tool annotations missing. Risk classifications (READ_ONLY, WRITE) are present in metadata but not exposed as MCP tool annotations (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint). Clients cannot optimize caching or request confirmation.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | C | 61 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
agent_browser_act 'actionClass' parameter lacks validation guidance. Description mentions 'trusted domain' escalation but does not specify what constitutes a trusted domain or how the LLM should handle rejection.
No pagination or result-limiting guidance. agent_browser_visit returns 'accessibility-tree snapshot' but does not document max size, truncation behavior, or how to handle large DOMs.