MCP policy decision point (PDP) and proxy server for enforcing fine-grained access control over MCP tool calls using manifest-based policies and JWT capabilities
eunox exposes 4 file/database tools with minimal descriptions (10-20 chars each) and incomplete schemas. Tool names follow verb_noun convention (read_file, write_file, list_dir, query_db), but descriptions lack context on WHEN to use each tool, prerequisites, or return structure. Input schemas present but lack required/additionalProperties constraints. No output schemas documented. No error handling guidance. No parameter descriptions beyond bare type hints. Security risk: query_db accepts arbitrary SQL with no validation hints. File tools lack path traversal guards in descriptions.
List a directory
Query a database
Read a file
Write a file
All tool descriptions are under 20 characters and provide no context on WHEN to use the tool, prerequisites, or return structure.
No output schemas documented for any tool. LLMs cannot plan downstream calls or extract required fields (e.g., file content, directory listing structure, query results).
query_db accepts arbitrary SQL strings with no validation hints, format constraints, or injection guards documented. Critical security risk for prompt injection attacks.
File tools (read_file, write_file, list_dir) lack path traversal or sandbox boundary documentation. LLMs may attempt to access /etc/passwd or parent directories without explicit constraints.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | F | 43 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
Input schemas lack required field declarations and additionalProperties constraints. Unclear which parameters are mandatory vs optional.