MCP server for OpenHands integration, providing tools to manage conversations, execute tasks, and interact with an OpenHands AI agent orchestration platform
Hercules MCP has 8 tools with basic schemas and descriptions, but significant gaps prevent higher scoring. All tools have descriptions (10-150 chars, mostly adequate), and input schemas are present with type definitions. However, parameter descriptions are sparse or missing entirely (e.g., retrieve_logs has empty input schema with no description). Output schemas are not documented anywhere. Error handling is absent, no guidance on recovery, retryable vs. fatal errors, or actionable error messages. Tool naming is verb-first and clear (list_, create_, run_, execute_, get_, interrupt_, delete_, retrieve_), but descriptions lack context on when to use each tool vs. alternatives. No tool annotations (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint) despite clear risk levels (READ_ONLY, WRITE, DESTRUCTIVE). Parameter constraints are minimal, no enums, ranges, or format specs. The execute_bash tool is particularly risky: accepts arbitrary commands with no validation, sanitization, or injection guards documented. Overall, definitions are functional but lack the depth and rigor expected of production tools.
Create a new conversation session configured for a specific workspace. workspace_path: Host path (e.g. D:/AI workspace/Projects/my-project) initial_message: Optional task instruction to kick off the conversation
Permanently delete a conversation session and clean up its resources.
Execute a bash command inside the sandboxed OpenHands container.
Retrieve the current execution status and last response of an OpenHands conversation.
Immediately interrupt/pause the execution of a running conversation task.
List existing conversations/sessions in the OpenHands instance.
retrieve_logs has empty input schema (no parameters documented) and truncated description. Cannot determine what filters or options are available.
execute_bash accepts arbitrary commands with no documented validation, sanitization, or injection guards. Critical security risk for command injection attacks.
No output schemas documented for any tool. LLMs cannot plan downstream calls or extract required fields (e.g., conversation_id from create_conversation).
No tool annotations (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint) despite clear risk levels. LLMs cannot determine which tools are safe to retry or have side effects.
Inferred effective spec: <=2025-11-25.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | D | 54 | <=2025-11-25 | v2 |
Retrieve execution logs from a conversation session (truncated in source)
Run/Resume a conversation session in the background.
No error handling guidance. Tools do not document what errors are retryable, what user-fixable errors look like, or how to recover from failures.