Create-only Google Workspace admin MCP server for employee onboarding — Google OAuth domain restriction, per-user allowlist, and keyless domain-wide delegation.
Three well-defined tools with strong naming (verb_noun pattern), comprehensive parameter schemas using Zod, and clear descriptions. All tools have input schemas with type definitions and constraints. Descriptions are detailed and action-oriented (100-200 chars), explaining WHAT, WHEN, and security implications. Error handling is explicit and user-facing. However, output schemas are not formally documented in the code, and tool annotations (readOnlyHint/destructiveHint) are absent despite clear risk profiles.
Check whether candidate company addresses are free in BOTH Google Workspace (users + aliases, incl. suspended) AND full Slack history (incl. deactivated members — addresses ever used are never reused). Read-only.
Create a company Google Workspace account in the configured target OU with a server-generated temporary password (never revealed) and change-at-first-login forced. Guards: company domain only, refuses existing or previously-used addresses (GWS + Slack history, never-reuse), max 3 creates/day.
Reset the account to a fresh server-generated temporary password (change forced at first login) and email it to the hire's personal address from the configured IT sender address. Use at T-1 before start date.
Output schemas not formally documented. Tools return JSON.stringify(results) but no schema definition visible for what fields clients should expect (e.g., EmailAvailability structure, create result fields, send result fields).
Tool annotations missing. create_user and send_credentials_email are destructive (WRITE risk) but lack destructiveHint annotation. check_email_availability is read-only but lacks readOnlyHint. These hints help LLMs reason about safety and retry logic.
No pagination or result limits documented. check_email_availability accepts 1-10 candidates (good), but no guidance on what happens if Slack lookup returns thousands of deactivated members or if GWS returns many aliases.
Inferred effective spec: 2026-07-28+.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | C | 69 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
Error messages are user-facing but lack recovery guidance. 'Refused: SLACK_BOT_TOKEN not configured' tells the LLM the call failed but not what to do next (e.g., 'Configure SLACK_BOT_TOKEN in environment and retry').
No dry-run or confirmation step for destructive operations. create_user and send_credentials_email modify state irreversibly (account creation, password reset) but offer no preview or confirmation pattern to prevent agent mistakes.