Single tool 'stake' has a complete input schema with three parameters (protocol, private_key, amount), each with type and description. However, critical security and design issues severely limit quality. The tool exposes private_key as a parameter, a hard violation of pattern:secret-injection. No output schema is documented. Description is minimal (18 chars) and lacks context on when/why to use it, prerequisites, or what it returns. No error handling guidance. Tool performs a write operation (staking) but lacks idempotency guarantees, confirmation patterns, or recovery guidance. Parameter descriptions are present but lack format constraints (e.g., amount format, protocol enum values). No pagination, no structured output documented.

• Move private_key to server-side secret injection. Accept only wallet_address or account_name as parameters. Retrieve the private key from environment or vault inside the tool implementation.
• Expand tool description to 100-150 chars: 'Stake MON tokens on a specified LST protocol. Returns transaction hash and confirmation status. Requires valid wallet with sufficient MON balance. Operation is irreversible, verify protocol and amount before calling.'
• Document output schema: {transaction_hash: string, status: 'pending'|'confirmed'|'failed', amount_staked: string, protocol: string, timestamp: ISO8601}.
• Add 'protocol' as an enum: ['shMON', 'aprMON', 'gMON'] to prevent invalid protocol names. Add 'amount' format constraint: 'Decimal string (e.g., 0.005), minimum 0.001, maximum 1000000.'
• Implement idempotency via transaction deduplication (idempotency_key parameter) and return clear error messages: 'Insufficient balance: have 0.002 MON, need 0.005' or 'Protocol shMON not available on monadTestnet.'

Inferred effective spec: <=2025-11-25.

• Relies on Logging (deprecated) - log to stderr or use OpenTelemetry