One binary. Zero runtime services. Hardened AI agent sandboxes via MCP — Docker + Podman.
Agentic Armor defines 8 tools with clear action verbs (task_create, task_exec, task_upload, task_download, task_list, task_stop, task_delete, task_logs). Tool descriptions are present and substantive (100-150 chars), explaining WHAT each tool does and WHEN to use it. However, critical parameter descriptions are missing or incomplete. The task_create schema shown includes descriptions for taskId, name, owner, image, blockNpmScripts, and network, good coverage. But task_exec, task_upload, task_download, task_stop, task_delete, and task_logs schemas are not visible in the provided source; only their names and brief descriptions appear. Output schemas are not documented. Error handling is present (ArmorError, ArmorResult types) but recovery guidance is not visible in the code excerpt. Audit logging via tombstones is a strong security pattern, but not reflected in tool descriptions.
Create a new task sandbox with a hardened Docker container. Network is disabled by default; pass network='bridge' only when the task needs package installs or git clone.
Delete a task and its associated container, retaining audit events.
Download a file from a task container with base64 encoding.
Execute a command inside a task container with timeout, user context, and working directory control.
List all tasks with their current status and metadata.
Retrieve audit events and logs for a task.
Stop a running task container with graceful shutdown and timeout.
Seven of eight tools lack visible input schemas in source code. Only task_create schema is shown.
Output schemas are not documented. LLMs cannot plan downstream calls or extract required fields (e.g., task_id from task_create response, or pagination info from task_list). Violates pattern:tool and pattern:paginated-result.
task_list lacks pagination parameters (limit, offset, cursor) and result count. Returning all tasks could blow context window. No indication of result limits or how to iterate.
Inferred effective spec: <=2025-11-25.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | F | 42 | <=2025-11-25 | v2 |
Upload a file into a task container with base64 encoding and chunked transfer to handle large payloads.
Destructive tools (task_delete, task_stop) lack confirmation or dry-run support. Agents can irreversibly delete tasks without a safety gate. No mention of idempotency or retry safety.
Error handling code exists (ArmorError, ArmorResult) but recovery guidance is not visible in tool descriptions. LLMs cannot determine if errors are retryable or what to do next.