Plugin artifact file-management CLI (pack / sign / push / pull / verify). Binary: `mcpg-plugin`.
This is a CLI tool wrapped as an MCP server with significant definition gaps. Tool names lack action verbs (e.g., 'hash', 'sign', 'pack' are acceptable but 'cache gc' is awkward). Descriptions are present but brief (avg ~80 chars, below the 194-char baseline). Input schemas ARE visible and properly typed with descriptions, which is a strength. However, OUTPUT schemas are completely undocumented, no tool specifies what it returns, forcing LLMs to guess. Error handling is absent from all tool definitions. The 'sign' tool exposes a security anti-pattern: it accepts a 'key' parameter (private key file path), which could leak secrets into logs. No tool declares permissions, audit trails, or idempotency guarantees. The 'cache gc' tool is destructive but has no confirmation pattern. Overall, this reads as a straightforward CLI port without LLM-specific optimization.
Garbage-collect the local OCI unpack cache
Compute SHA-256 of an artifact
List plugin artifacts in a directory (defaults to MCPG_PLUGIN_DIR, falling back to the current directory).
Scaffold a working plugin crate with the unified declare_plugin! macro pre-wired, a sibling plugin.yaml matching the in-code manifest, and a single-source Cargo.toml ready for both cdylib OCI distribution and static-firstparty embedding.
Bundle a plugin.yaml descriptor + built artifact (+ optional detached signature + optional LICENSE text) into a distributable package.
Fetch a packaged plugin from an OCI registry
Publish a packaged plugin to an OCI registry
No output schemas documented for any tool. LLMs cannot plan downstream calls or extract required fields (e.g., what does 'hash' return? A string? An object with hash+algorithm?). This violates the pattern:tool requirement and forces agents to guess.
Security anti-pattern: 'sign' tool accepts 'key' parameter (private key file path). Private keys should never be exposed as tool parameters, they end up in logs and traces. Use server-side secret injection or require the key via environment variable.
Destructive tool 'cache gc' lacks confirmation or dry-run pattern. An agent could accidentally garbage-collect the entire OCI cache without safeguards. Add a 'dry_run' parameter (present in schema but not documented) and require explicit confirmation for destructive operations.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | F | 47 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
Create an Ed25519 detached signature over an artifact, with the key supplied directly (--key <private-key-file>) or via an external signer (--subprocess <cmd>).
Load a packaged plugin into an in-process mock gateway and exercise its vtable contract.
Extract a packaged plugin archive
Verify artifact signature and/or hash
Tool name 'cache gc' violates verb_noun convention. Should be 'garbage_collect_cache' or 'clear_cache'. Current name is ambiguous and harder for LLMs to parse.
No error handling guidance in any tool description. If 'push' fails due to invalid registry credentials, what should the agent do? Retry? Ask the user? No recovery hints provided.