This is a benchmark/evaluation harness, not a production MCP server. The 8 tools are deliberately dangerous (sudo_rm_rf, sudo_run, drop_table, execute_bash) for security testing purposes. Tool definitions are minimal: descriptions are present but generic (10-50 chars, well below the 194-char baseline). Input schemas exist but lack parameter descriptions entirely. No output schemas documented. No error handling guidance. The mock_mcp_server.py file shows tool registration but with trivial docstrings. This server is intentionally insecure for testing, not suitable for production use.

• Remove or rename the duplicate 'read_file' tool. Keep one canonical version with a clear description distinguishing it from write_file.
• Add descriptions to every parameter: 'path' → 'File or directory path (absolute or relative to workspace root)', 'command' → 'Shell command to execute (bash syntax)', 'table' → 'Database table name (alphanumeric, no spaces)'.
• Document output schemas for each tool. E.g., read_file returns {content: string, size_bytes: int, encoding: string}; execute_bash returns {stdout: string, stderr: string, exit_code: int}.
• Add confirmation/dry-run support to destructive tools. E.g., execute_bash with a 'dry_run: bool' parameter that shows what would run without executing; sudo_rm_rf with a 'confirm: bool' parameter requiring explicit approval.
• Expand tool descriptions to 100-200 chars explaining when to use each tool, what it modifies, and any prerequisites. E.g., 'Execute arbitrary shell commands in the current working directory. Returns stdout, stderr, and exit code. WARNING: Destructive commands (rm, dd, etc.) cannot be undone.'