This server exposes a single tool 'execute' that runs arbitrary shell commands. The tool has a minimal description ('Execute planning command') and a basic input schema with only a 'command' string parameter. No output schema is documented. The tool lacks parameter descriptions, error guidance, and security controls. This is a destructive, high-risk tool with no safeguards, confirmation steps, or audit logging. The implementation directly calls child_process.exec() without sanitization, making it vulnerable to command injection. No MCP protocol features are implemented beyond basic HTTP.
Execute planning command
Tool name 'execute' is generic and does not follow verb_noun convention. 'execute' is vague, does it execute code, shell commands, or arbitrary operations? Should be 'run_command' or 'execute_shell_command' to clarify intent.
Description 'Execute planning command' is only 26 characters and provides no context for when/why to use this tool, what it returns, or what happens on error. Baseline for A+ tools is 194 chars. Must explain: What does it do? What command types are safe? What does it return?
Input parameter 'command' lacks a description. LLMs cannot infer what command format is expected, what constraints apply, or what values are valid. Must add description explaining format, examples of safe commands, and any restrictions.
No output schema documented. LLMs cannot plan downstream operations or extract results. Must document that response contains {stdout: string, stderr: string} with field descriptions.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | F | 20 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
Destructive tool with no confirmation step, dry-run mode, or permission gate. Agents can execute arbitrary commands (rm -rf /, kill processes, exfiltrate data) without safeguards. Must implement confirmation_before_execute pattern or restrict to whitelisted commands.