Critical gaps across all dimensions. Tool 'add' has a trivial 18-char description ('An addition tool') that fails the 20-char minimum and provides no context for LLM selection. Tool 'query' has NO description at all (null/missing), violating the fundamental requirement that every tool must have a non-empty description. Both tools have input schemas with parameter types (number, string) but ZERO parameter descriptions, the 'a', 'b', and 'sql' parameters lack any explanation of what they control or their constraints. The 'query' tool exposes a dangerous SQL injection surface with no input validation, sanitization, or guidance. No output schemas are documented. Error handling in 'query' returns raw error messages without recovery guidance. No tool annotations (readOnlyHint/destructiveHint) despite 'query' being marked WRITE risk. Naming is generic ('add', 'query'), 'add' should be 'add_numbers' and 'query' should be 'execute_sql_query' to clarify intent. No pagination, no result limits, no chaining IDs in responses.

• Add a non-empty description to 'query' (50-200 chars): 'Execute a SQL query against the database. Returns results as JSON. WARNING: This tool modifies data, use with caution.'
• Add descriptions to all parameters: 'a' → 'First number to add (numeric value)', 'b' → 'Second number to add (numeric value)', 'sql' → 'SQL query string (SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE). Must be valid SQL syntax.'
• Rename 'add' to 'add_numbers' and 'query' to 'execute_sql_query' to clarify intent and follow verb_noun convention.
• Implement SQL injection protection: use parameterized queries, validate SQL syntax, and reject dangerous keywords (DROP, TRUNCATE, ALTER). Return actionable errors: 'Invalid SQL: DROP not allowed. Use SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, or DELETE only.'
• Document output schemas in tool descriptions: 'add' returns {type: 'text', text: '<sum as string>'}; 'query' returns {type: 'text', text: '<JSON array of result rows>'}. Add result limits and pagination guidance.