A personal secrets vault MCP server. Your AI coding agent injects your API keys without ever seeing their values. Works with Claude, Cursor, Windsurf, Antigravity and any MCP client.
vault-mcp has 15 tools with complete input schemas and descriptions. Naming is verb-forward and clear (vault_search, vault_inject_env, vault_delete_secret). Descriptions are present and contextual (avg ~80 chars), explaining WHAT and WHEN. However, parameter descriptions are sparse, many lack detail on format, constraints, or dependencies. Output schemas are not documented in the tool definitions. Error handling is minimal; no recovery guidance or actionable error messages visible. Security is strong (secrets never exposed as params, server-side injection via environment), but composition could be tighter, vault_inject_env and vault_render_file overlap in intent. The INSTRUCTIONS resource is excellent for agent guidance but does not substitute for per-tool schema documentation.
Add a new secret to the vault
Create an encrypted backup of the vault
Delete a secret from the vault
Write secrets into a .env file
List all available backups
Lock the vault
Open the vault management UI in the browser
List available service presets with their field definitions
Fill {{vault:path}} placeholders in a config file with secret values
Output schemas not documented. Tools return results but LLMs cannot see what fields to expect (e.g., vault_search returns what? IDs, metadata, counts?). Forces agents to guess downstream field names.
Parameter descriptions lack format/constraint details. 'filePath' has no guidance on absolute vs relative paths, or validation rules. 'passphrase' says '10 chars' but no regex or format hint. LLMs cannot validate inputs before calling.
No error handling guidance. Tools do not document what errors are retryable, user-fixable, or fatal. No recovery hints (e.g., 'If vault is locked, call vault_unlock first'). Agents cannot self-correct on failure.
| Scored | Grade | Overall | Spec posture | Rubric |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | D | 52 | 2026-07-28+ | v2 |
Restore the vault from a backup
Run a command with secrets injected into its environment
Search for secrets in the vault by name, tag, or description
Write secrets into a remote server's environment file via SSH
Unlock the vault with the access code (PIN)
Update a secret's metadata or value
vault_inject_env and vault_render_file overlap in intent (both write secrets to files). Naming does not distinguish when to use each. Agents may pick wrong tool or waste reasoning cycles.
Destructive tools (vault_delete_secret, vault_restore with 'replace' mode) lack confirmation/dry-run support. No pattern to prevent accidental data loss. Agents can delete secrets without a safety gate.